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Geoengineering: Ethics, Risks and Rights 
 
Sam Adelman 
School of Law, University of Warwick UK 
 
Abstract: Geoengineering technologies generate intense ethical debates about the risks 
that manipulating the Earth’s climate will provoke unforeseen, unintended and 
uncontrollable consequences that threaten human rights. This article focuses on the 
advantages and risks of solar radiation management techniques (also known as albedo 
management), which are difficult to test on a wide scale and may not be capable of 
being recalled after deployment. Adequate governance structures do not currently exist 
to assess and regulate the risks of climate engineering, and SRM technologies have not 
been clearly shown to be safe. SRM raises significant ethical problems which lead me 
to conclude that we need to fix our attitudes rather than the planet, eschew 
technological hubris, and accept that the safest technological solution is renewable 
energy. 
 
Keywords: Geoengineering; solar radiation management; human rights; risk, ethics; 
governance 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The widely accepted definition of geoengineering is the ‘deliberate, large-scale manipulation 
of the planetary environment in order to counteract anthropogenic climate change.’1 The term 
refers to diverse techniques commonly divided into two groups. Solar radiation management 
(SRM) techniques are designed to reduce solar radiation reaching the Earth’s surface by 
injecting sulphate particles into the stratosphere-the so-called Pinatubo effect that that aims to 
simulate the effects of volcanic eruptions. SRM is often claimed to be cheap to develop and 
easy to deploy, with positive short-term but dangerous long-term effects. The Royal Society 
viewed SRM as fast and cheap, but uncertain and prone to unintended side effects that may 
 
1 Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty (The Royal Society, 
London 2009) 1. 
not be able to be unwound.2 Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) techniques such as carbon 
capture and storage and ocean fertilisation remove CO2 from the atmosphere.
3 CDR is 
expensive and time-consuming to develop, but safe and effective in the long-term. 
 
The main contention in this article is that SRM technologies in their current forms pose 
insuperable ethical and governance questions because it is unclear that their benefits 
outweigh their risks and, therefore, that unforeseen and unintended consequences of their 
deployment are likely to threaten the human rights of current and future generations. Once 
implemented, SRM may be uncontainable and irreversible. I argue that SRM creates a moral 
hazard and is likely to have a disproportionately negative effects on climate sensitive regions 
of the global South with low adaptive capacities. 
 
The paper is divided into six sections. Following this introductory section, I briefly outline 
the threat that climate change poses to a range of human rights including fundamental rights 
such as the rights to life and to food. I evaluate the risks of SRM in section 3 and address the 
ethics of geoengineering and the dangers arising from an overweening faith in technological 
solutions in section 4. The fifth section examines some of the difficulties in developing a 
governance regime for geoengineering, the relevance of principles of international 
environmental law such as the precautionary principle, and importance of procedural rights in 
decisions about the possible deployment of geoengineering.4. In the concluding section I 
argue that the risks of SRM outweigh its potential benefits and that the safest and most ethical 
way to address climate change is through the use of renewable technologies that are known to 
be safe and effective in reducing emissions. 
 
Climate manipulation may be irreversible consequences because scientists cannot be certain 
how the biosphere will respond to forced interventions. These include concerns that SSI 
 
2 On unintended side effects, see Clive Hamilton, Earthmasters: The Dawn of the Age of Climate Engineering 
(Yale University Press, New Haven 2013) 115-16. 
3 Geoengineering is regularly described as a complement to adaptation and mitigation (Royal Society n 1 57), 
but Heyward argues that it should not be conceived as a third category but that CDR and SRM should instead 
‘be regarded as two parts of a five-part continuum of responses to climate change.’ Clare Heyward, ‘Situating 
and Abandoning Geoengineering: A Typology of Five Responses to Dangerous Climate Change’ (2013) PS: 
Political Science & Politics 46 23, 23. Geoengineering is also referred to as climate engineering and I use the 
terms interchangeably. 
4 I limit my discussion to the precautionary and no-harm principles. For an extensive examination of other 
applicable international law see J Reynolds ‘Climate Engineering Field Research: The Favorable Setting of 
International Environmental Law’ (2014) Washington & Lee Journal of Energy, Climate and Environment 5 
417. 
could lead to feedback processes that increase ‘”acid rain” and exacerbate ocean 
acidification.’5 The 2009 Royal Society report regarded stratospheric sulfate injection (SSI) 
as more promising than space-based SRM methods but argued that significant research and 
development is ‘required to identify and evaluate potential impacts on the hydrological cycle, 
stratospheric ozone and on the biosphere prior to deployment.’6 I focus on SRM in general 
and SSI in particular because their consequences are more uncertain than CDR and thus give 
rise to the more profound ethical dilemmas. Like albedo reflection techniques, SSI may be 
relatively straightforward in technological terms but carries (foreseeable) risks that sulphates 
might slow or reverse the recovery of the ozone layer and reduce global rainfall (which may 
become more acidic) while increasing flooding and intensifying extreme weather events.7 
SRM is technically more difficult than CDR and merely offsets some effects of greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions, whereas the latter is both less risky and addresses the cause of climate 
change. CDR is generally considered to be relatively benign but will be extremely expensive 
to deploy on a scale sufficient to prevent average global temperature from increasing by more 
than targets in article 2 of the Paris Agreement.8 If successful, geoengineering will take 
decades to reduce atmospheric CO2 to safe levels. Like other SRM technologies, SSI is 
highly speculative. Because it cannot be adequately be tested in laboratories or large-scale 
field trials, scientists are forced to rely on models that are intrinsically uncertain.9 As such, it 
raises complex issues of justice, ethics, liability, accountability and governance. 
 
5 Royal Society n 1 36; Y Chang and A Posch ‘The Wickedness and Complexity of Decision Making in 
Geoengineering’ (2014) Challenges 5(2), 390. 
6 Royal Society, n 1 36. Space-based techniques include placing mirrors in space to deflect incoming radiation; 
other SRM methods include cloud brightening and painting roofs white to reflect sunlight. 
7 For an evaluation of the risks of SSI see National Research Council of the National Academies, Climate 
Intervention: Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth (National Academies Press, Washington, DC 2015). See also 
‘The Hidden Dangers of Geoengineering’, Scientific American, 3 October 2008 
<http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-hidden-dangers-of-geoengineering/> (last accessed 15 
September 2015). On the regional effects of geoengineering see A Robock et al., ‘Regional Climate Responses 
to Geoengineering with Tropical and Arctic SO₂  Injections’ (2008) Journal of Geophysical Research: 
Atmospheres 113, D16101. Robock has expressed concerns at the CIA’s interest in geoengineering: ‘The CIA 
asked me about controlling the climate – this is why we should worry’, The Guardian, 17 February 2015 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/17/cia-controlling-climate-geoengineering-climate-
change> accessed 18 February 2015. 
8 On the limitations of CDR, see E Kintisch, ‘Can Sucking CO2 Out of the Atmosphere Really Work?’ 
<https://www.technologyreview.com/s/531346/can-sucking-co2-out-of-the-atmosphere-really-work/> accessed 
29 March 2016. Under article 2, parties aim to hold ‘the increase in the global average temperature to well 
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels.’ Small island developing states have long insisted that the latter figure is a prerequisite for their 
survival. Article 4.1 is similarly vague, stating that ‘In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in 
Article 2, Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible.’ Paris 
Agreement (FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, 12 December 2015). 
9 Stilgoe notes that ‘research using models is at an early stage.’ J Stilgoe Experiment Earth: Responsible 
Innovation in Geoengineering (Routledge, Abingdon 2015) 171. 
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) finds that GHG emissions have 
reached dangerous levels and its work clearly indicates that we are facing a planetary 
emergency which increasingly threatens the human rights of current and future generations.10 
In 2015, driven by climate change and a strong El Niño, global average surface temperature 
records were broken by the strikingly wide margin of 0.76°C above the average between 
1961 and 1990. Ocean heat down to 700m and 2000m also broke all previous records. The 
World Meteorological Organization’s (WMO) 2014 figures put CO2 levels at 397.7 ppm, 43 
per cent higher than pre-industrial levels and on the brink of breaking through the symbolic 
level of 400 ppm.11 Sea level, measured by both traditional tide gauges and satellites, was 
also the highest on record.12 As WMO Secretary-General Petteri Taalas observes, ‘We have 
reached for the first time the threshold of 1°C above pre-industrial temperatures. It is a 
sobering moment in the history of our planet.’13 
 
2. Climate Change and Human Rights 
 
The impacts of anthropogenic global warming affect everyone but those least responsible for 
GHG emissions, the poor and vulnerable, invariably suffer most-especially those in the global 
South due to underdevelopment, low adaptive capacities and greater reliance on climate 
sensitive sectors such as agriculture. Non-human species are profoundly affected by human 
activity.14 Climate change affects a wide range of human rights, not least those of the 
inhabitants of small island states at risk of inundation. In 2007, the Association of Small 
Island States (AOSIS), which represents small island states threatened with inundation from 
rising sea levels, expressed alarm that climate change threatens the full enjoyment of human 
rights including inter alia the rights to life, to take part in cultural life, to use and enjoy 
property, to an adequate standard of living, to food, and to the highest attainable standard of 
 
10 On the science, see IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report - Longer Report (Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, Geneva 2014. On the threat to human rights, see H Shue, Climate Justice: Vulnerability and 
Protection (OUP, Oxford 2014). 
11 The latest available at the time of writing. 
12 M Slezak ‘Global warming taking place at an ‘alarming rate’, UN climate body warns’, The Guardian 16 
March 2016 <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/21/global-warming-taking-place-at-an-
alarming-rate-un-climate-body-warns> accessed 25 March 2016. 
13 ‘2015 is hottest year on record’ <http://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/2015-hottest-year-record> 
accessed 25 March 2016. 
14 More than half of all species (52 per cent) were lost between 1970 and 2010: WWF, Living Planet Report 
2014. Species and spaces, people and places (WWF International, Gland, Switzerland 2014) 8. 
physical and mental health. AOSIS adopted the Malé Declaration on [the] Human Dimension 
of Global Climate Change which asserts ‘the fundamental right to an environment capable of 
supporting human society and the full enjoyment of human rights.’15 
 
Richardson et al. estimate that a one metre sea level rise will eliminate the lowest islands and 
‘10% of the global population–over 650 million people-will be directly impacted by a sea-
level rise of between 0.5 m and 1.0 m, which now may represent a best-case scenario.’16 
Amongst the human rights that will be threatened are the rights to life, food, health, property, 
the benefits of culture, to family life and their rights to use and enjoy the lands they have 
traditionally occupied.17 The fifth IPCC assessment report warns that the impacts of 
anthropogenic global warming will be ‘severe, pervasive and irreversible.’18 The IPCC 
predicts that injuries, diseases and deaths will increase due to more intense heatwaves and 
fires, and under-nutrition will result from diminished food production in poor regions of the 
world. The right to health will increasingly be threatened by food- and water- and vector-
borne diseases.19 
 
The right to private and family life and the right to culture will be affected as increasing 
warming puts some ecosystems at risk of abrupt and irreversible changes that will reduce 
economic growth and poverty reduction, erode food security and trigger new poverty traps, 
particularly in urban areas and hunger hotspots. The IPCC predicts with high confidence that 
hundreds of millions of people will be displaced by land loss from coastal and inland 
 
15 Male’ Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change, 14 November 2007 
<http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Male_Declaration_Nov07.pdf> accessed 17 March 2016. 
16 K Richardson, W Steffen and D Liverman (eds), Climate Change: Global Risks, Challenges and Decisions 
(CUP, Cambridge 2011), 66. 
17 The 2005 Inuit petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights contended that climate change is 
undermining, inter alia, their rights to life and health, fundamental rights to residence, movement, the 
inviolability of the home, and the right to subsistence. Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the 
United States (7 December, 2005) <http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/library/legal_docs/summary-of-
inuit-petition-to-inter-american-council-on-human-rights.pdf> accessed 2 February 2015. On the first day of 
COP 21 in Paris, the Philippines Commission on Human Rights agreed to hear a petition claiming that the 
world’s 50 oil majors have violated the human rights of Filipino’s-and by extension, all of humanity 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/PageFiles/105904/Climate-Change-and-Human-Rights-Complaint.pdf> 
accessed 26 March 2016. 
18 IPCC n 10 14. For an extended discussion of climate change and human rights see S Adelman, ‘Rethinking 
human rights: the impact of climate change on the dominant discourse’ in S Humphreys (ed), Human Rights and 
Climate Change (CUP, Cambridge 2010) and S Adelman ‘Human Rights and Climate Change’ in G Digiacomo 
(ed), Human Rights: Current Issues and Controversies (University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2016). 
19 M L. Parry et al., Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working 
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (CUP, Cambridge 
2007). 
flooding with a concomitant increase of risks of death, injury, severe ill-health, and disrupted 
livelihoods in low-lying coastal zones and small-island developing states due to storm surges 
and rising sea levels.20 
 
The right to food will be threatened by the breakdown of food systems due to warming, 
drought, flooding, and desertification. All aspects of food security are likely to be affected, 
not least access to food. Rural livelihoods and income will be undermined by insufficient 
access to water for drinking and irrigation, and reduced agricultural productivity-especially 
for farmers and pastoralists with minimal capital in semi-arid regions. In Africa ‘between 75 
million and 250 million people are projected to be exposed to increased water stress’ by 
2020.21 
 
Somewhat bizarrely, in 2009 the first international body to address the relationship between 
human rights and climate change, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, decided that although climate change threatens a wide range of human rights it does 
not necessarily violate them. The OCHCR nonetheless concluded that human rights law 
imposes obligations on states in relation to climate change, including an obligation of 
international cooperation.22 
 
3. Geoengineering and Risk 
 
To secure public consent, the benefits of a technology must outweigh its risks.23 It must 
provide an effective remedy to the problem it aims to solve, be controllable, containable and, 
if necessary, reversible, avoid creating a moral hazard24, and protect the human rights of 
current and future generations. Boyd et al. argue that social science is as important as natural 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 M L Parry n 19 13. 
22 OHCHR, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (15 January 2009). J Knox, 
(2009) ‘Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations’ Harvard Environmental Law Review 
33 477. 
23 See the chapters in I M. Mintzer (ed.), Confronting Climate Change: Risks, Implications and Responses 
(CUP, Cambridge 1992). 
24 An economic term referring to the possibility that people will take greater risks if they are insured, leaving 
insurers with more and larger claims than anticipated. The UK House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee recommended limiting the application of the precautionary principle on the basis that applying it 
might limit British research without preventing other actors from violating common rules. House of Commons, 
Science and Technology Committee: The Regulation of Geoengineering, Fifth report of session 2009-10 (The 
Stationery Office, London 2010). 
science in evaluating risk, and that factors such as betrayal aversion and risk equity are two 
factors that demonstrate why ignoring public opinion is undemocratic and inappropriate.25 In 
addition, ‘subjective views and value judgments heavily influence how individuals perceive 
both the risks of climate change and the potential benefits and costs of risk management 
options.’26 
 
Climate change creates risks of social and political unrest and armed conflicts that undermine 
human rights.27 It threatens the right to peace and security and indirectly increases ‘risks from 
violent conflict in the form of civil war, inter-group violence, and violent protests by 
exacerbating well-established drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic 
shocks.’28 Geoengineering increases the risk of conflict because of the danger that the effects 
of an attempt by one or more countries to manipulate their climate will not be limited to a 
locality or region without affecting that of other countries. For this reason, attempts by a 
single state or bloc to deploy a ‘global thermostat’ may be regarded as an hostile act.29 In 
2015, the US National Academy of Sciences expressed ‘serious concern … that such an 
action could be unilaterally undertaken by a nation or smaller entity for their own benefit 
without international sanction and regardless of international consequences.’30 
 
25 W Boyd, D Kysar and J J Rachlinski, ‘Law, Environment, and the “Nondismal” Social Sciences’, Cornell 
Law Faculty Publications (2012) Paper 643 <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/643> accessed 9 
February 2015. Betrayal aversion leads people to take risks less willingly when the agent of uncertainty is 
another person rather than nature. 
26 P A T Higgins and J V Steinbuck, ‘A Conceptual Tool for Climate Change Risk Assessment’ (2014) Earth 
Interactions 18 1, 2. 
27 S H Schneider, ‘Geo-engineering: Could We or Should We Make it Work?’ in B Launder and M Thompson 
(eds), Geo-Engineering Climate Change: Environmental Necessity or Pandora’s Box? (CUP, Cambridge, 
2010), 7. See also G Dyer, Climate Wars: The Fight for Survival as the World Overheats (Oneworld, Oxford 
2010) and the papers in F Gemenne et al, (2014) Climatic Change 123(1) Special Issue: Climate and Security: 
Evidence, Emerging Risks, and a New Agenda. Evidence suggests that drought exacerbated by global warming 
is a contributory factor in the Syrian civil war that erupted in 2011. C P. Kelley et al., ‘Climate change in the 
Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought’ (2015) Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences. 112(11) 3241. 
28 The World Economic Forum regards the failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation as the biggest 
global risk: WEF, The Global Risks Report 2016 (Geneva: WEF, 2016) and the Pentagon anticipates that 
‘Global climate change will have wide ranging implications for US national security interests over the 
foreseeable future because it will aggravate existing problems - such poverty, social tensions, environmental 
degradation, ineffectual leadership, and weak political institutions – that threaten political stability in a number 
of countries.’ US Department of Defense, Report on National Security Implications of Climate Related Risks 
and a Changing Climate <http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/150724-congressional-report-on-national-
implications-of-climate-change.pdf?source=govdelivery> accessed 17 September 2015 at 3. 
29 See W W Kellogg and S H Schneider, ‘Climate stabilization: for better or for worse?’ (1974) Science 
186:4170 1163-1172; S Barrett, ‘The incredible economics of geoengineering’, (2008) Environmental and 
Resource Economics 39(1) 45-54, 41; A Maas and I Comardicea, ‘Climate Gambit: Engineering Climate 
Security Risks?’ in G D Dabelko et al. (eds) Backdraft: The Conflict Potential of Climate Change Adaptation 
and Mitigation (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC 2013) 37. 
30 National Research Council of the National Academies, n 7 ix-x. 
 Objections to climate engineering arise from concerns that it ‘entails “messing with” a 
complex, poorly understood system’31 and creates unacceptable levels of uncertainty and 
risk.32 In 2012, a British project to test sulphur injection into the atmosphere was abandoned, 
ostensibly due to difficulties with a patent application.33 Proponents of geoengineering 
counter that the Anthropocene is the result of unprecedented manipulation of the climate 
through greenhouse gas emissions that will require further inventions necessary if and when 
mitigation is conclusively demonstrated to have failed.34 They argue that it is not clear that 
geoengineering is more unpredictable or risky, and that potentially negative side-effects are 
not more ethically problematic than the continued use of fossil fuels.35 
 
In 2014, a team of researchers compared five proposed methods of climate engineering and 
concluded that all were ‘relatively ineffective’ and might have ‘potentially severe side 
effects.’ Reflecting the sun’s rays into space would alter rainfall patterns, while reforesting 
deserts could change wind patterns and possibly reduce tree growth in other regions. They 
concluded that two of the five methods considered could not be safely stopped, and that ‘if 
solar radiation management or ocean upwelling is discontinued then rapid warming occurs. If 
the other methods are discontinued, less dramatic changes occur.’ The researchers expressed 
concern that such interventions may lead to chaos in complex and not fully understood 
weather systems resulting in catastrophe, and that they would achieve a maximum reduction 
in temperature of 8 per cent even if they are widely deployed.36 In other words, SRM 
 
31 D W Keith, ‘Geoengineering the climate: History and prospect’ (2000) Annual Review of Energy and the 
Environment 25 245, 277. 
32 For a succinct survey of arguments for and against geoengineering see J Anshelm and A Hansson, ‘Battling 
Promethean Dreams and Trojan Horses: Revealing the Critical Discourses of Geoengineering’ (2014) Energy 
Research & Social Science. 2 135. 
33 N Pidgeon et al., ‘Deliberating Stratospheric Aerosols for Climate Geoengineering and the Spice Project’ 
(2013) Nature Climate Change. 3(5) 451. See also the E-PEACE Eastern Pacific Emitted Aerosol Cloud 
Experiment <http://aerosols.ucsd.edu/E_PEACE.html> accessed 15 September 2014. For an extended 
discussion of the SPICE project see Stilgoe n 9. 
34 For an evaluation of the risks of geoengineering see K Caldeira et al., ‘The Science of Geoengineering’ 
(2013) The Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences 41 231. 
35 The IPCC believes that although SRM has numerous side effects, risks and shortcomings, some methods, ‘if 
practicable, could substantially offset a global temperature rise and partially offset some other impacts of global 
warming, but the compensation for the climate change caused by GHGs would be imprecise.’ O Boucher et al., 
‘Clouds and Aerosols’ in T. F. Stocker et al., Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution 
of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (CUP, 
Cambridge 2013), 7. 
36 D P Keller et al., ‘Potential climate engineering effectiveness and side effects during a high carbon dioxide-
emission scenario’ (2014) Nature Communications 5, Article 3304. The methods modelled were reflecting 
sunlight from space, adding vast quantities of lime or iron filings to the oceans, pumping deep cold nutrient-rich 
potentially creates severs termination risks because it produces a cooling effect without 
reducing the overall amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, meaning that warming will resume if 
it is discontinued-and might be greater than if SRM had not been implemented. As Naomi 
Klein puts it, climate engineering ‘may cause the earth to go wild in ways we cannot imagine, 
making geoengineering not the final engineering frontier, another triumph to commemorate 
on the walls of the Royal Society, but the last tragic act in this centuries-long fairy tale of 
control.’37 It is difficult to disagree with the conclusion of Barrett et al. that plausible SRM 
scenarios suggest that ‘when its use is politically feasible, geoengineering may not be 
effective; and that, when its use might be effective, its deployment may not be politically 
feasible.’38 They argue that the insuperable problem confronting advocates of geoengineering 
is that it is difficult to model and risky to deploy uncertain technologies that may be 
reversible. Considering the possibility that geoengineering may increase global crop yields, 
Pongratz et al. provide a typical formulation of the dilemma: ‘although SRM may allow 
beneficial effects of CO2 fertilization at a comparatively low level of climate change, the 
potential for such approaches to reduce the overall risks is still far from established. The 
safest option to reduce the climate risks to global food security may be to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases.’39 SRM may be impossible to halt because of the dangers of unleashing 
suppressed heating in a short period. Some defenders of geoengineering appear willing to 
gamble that failure to reduce GHG concentrations in the atmosphere will push humanity to a 
tipping point at which the risk of doing nothing exceeds the hazards of doing something and 
generates irresistible pressure to manipulate the climate, leading states to become addicted to 
geoengineering.40 
 
Ferraro et al. applied a simple, risk-based framework to two climate model geoengineering 
simulations designed to counterbalance surface warming produced by a quadrupling of 
carbon dioxide concentrations, one using a layer of sulphate aerosol in the lower stratosphere, 
the other a reduction in total solar irradiance. Assuming that ‘the goal of geoengineering is 
 
waters to the surface of oceans, and irrigating vast areas of the north African and Australian deserts to grow 
millions of trees. 
37 N Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate (Allen Lane, London 2014) 267. 
38 S Barrett et al., ‘Climate Engineering Reconsidered’ (2014) Nature Climate Change 4 527, 529. 
39 J. Pongratz et al., ‘Crop Yields in a Geoengineered Climate’ (2012) Nature Climate Change 2(2) 101. 
40 Barrett et al., n 38. 
the reduction of the risk of exceeding a given climate threshold in a given year’ and that 
‘geoengineering may be considered successful if this risk is reduced.,’41 they found that: 
 
In the solar dimming simulation, 10% of the Earth's surface area, containing 10% of its 
population and 11% of its gross domestic product, experiences greater risk of 
substantial precipitation changes under geoengineering than under enhanced carbon 
dioxide concentrations. In the aerosol geoengineering simulation the increased risk of 
substantial precipitation change is experienced by 42% of Earth's surface area, 
containing 36% of its population and 60% of its gross domestic product.42 
 
The authors concluded that ‘the treatment itself carries risks, and substantial parts of the 
world (whether measured by area, population or economic activity) experience greater risk 
when the geoengineering treatment is applied than when the effects of CO2 on their climate 
are unabated.’43 
 
Balancing the putative advantages of SRM against the risks of unchecked GHG emissions 
relies on scientific inputs that can never produce definitive answers due to intrinsic 
uncertainties in both climate science and SRM techniques. Bioethical debates on human 
fertilisation and embryology suggest that securing consent about complex problems and 
technologies involves ethical, political and philosophical considerations that outweigh 
economic cost-benefit analyses and quantitative risk assessments.44 Both methods are 
ethically problematic when applied to risks that should not be valued only in monetary terms 
such as the loss of one’s homeland and culture. As Stern makes clear, conventional 
economics does not inadequately to address the needs of future generations and catastrophic 
risks resulting in non-substitutable loss and damage.45 Cost-benefit analysis discounts future 
costs and benefits to current values and tends to favour contemporary action over deferred 
 
41 Ferraro, Angus J., Andrew J. Charlton-Perez, and Eleanor J. Highwood. 2014. ‘A risk-based framework for 
assessing the effectiveness of stratospheric aerosol geoengineering’, PloS one 9(2): e88849, 1-6, 4. The authors 
warn that these results are ‘from a single climate model of intermediate complexity [and therefore may not be] a 
good measure of the potential real-world impacts of stratospheric aerosol geoengineering,’ 4-5. 
42 Ibid. 1. 
43 Ibid. 6. 
44 Beauchamp and Childress adumbrate four principles that should inform bioethics: autonomy, beneficence, 
avoiding and justice in the distribution of benefits and burdens. T L Beauchamp and J F Childress Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics (OUP, Oxford 2001). See Gardiner’s critique of cost-benefit analyses in S M Gardiner, ‘Is 
“Arming the Future” Really the Lesser Evil? Some Doubts about the Ethics of Intentionally Manipulating the 
Climate System’ in S M Gardiner et al., (eds), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (OUP, Oxford 2010) 287-88. 
45 N Stern, ‘The economics of climate change’ (2008) American Economic Review 98 1. 
benefits. It is essentially utilitarian and ‘has only a partial and contingent commitment to the 
basic interests and entitlements of the most vulnerable.’46 Klinke and Renn argue that the 
intrinsic uncertainties of albedo modification make risk-benefit analysis an inappropriate 
basis for deciding whether research should be encouraged.47 Quantitative environmental risk 
assessment is ostensibly neutral and objective but masks the value-laden premises in which 
risks are framed. The reduction of: 
 
complex causalities to individual ‘risk factors’ plays down the distributive effects of 
risk, emphasizes what is known about an issue at the expense of what is not known, and 
tends to privilege physical and biological sciences over social sciences. The very 
concept of risk, moreover, implies the possibility of management, and hence tacitly 
favours moving ahead with new activities under controls that experts consider suitably 
protective.48 
 
A third approach is comparative risk analysis, which combines three principles: 
environmental policy making must be technocratic rather than political, environmental risks 
should be measured in terms of potential losses, for example of habitats and ecosystems, and 
risks should be reduced to a common metric.49 
 
Following the work of Ulrich Beck and others, risk evaluation is no longer regarded as a 
technical matter best left to scientists or economists.50 Cotton argues that ‘Risk is now 
established as a complex multi-dimensional psychological construct and a form of social 
discourse. [This] involves paying attention to the wider context of individuals’ beliefs, 
attitudes, perceptions, judgements and feelings, alongside significant questions of ethics and 
political governance.’51 How the risks posed by geoengineering are perceived in public 
discourse will greatly influence ethical and political responses. 
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4. The Ethics of Geoengineering 
 
Nobel chemistry laureate Paul Crutzen’s cautious suggestion in 2006 that SRM should be 
considered a legitimate way to reduce the impacts of climate change ignited a fierce ethical 
debate that shows no signs of abating.52 On one side of the debate are those who fear that 
climate engineering may unleash unforeseeable risks, exacerbate the effects of rising sea 
levels, intensify ocean acidification and lead to significant alterations in seasonal and spatial 
patterns of precipitation resulting in droughts, desertification and flooding that threaten 
human rights. In the opposing camp are those who argue that geoengineering may be the only 
means available to protect human rights if the Paris Agreement does not succeed limiting 
dangerous anthropogenic warming. On this basis, they argue that geoengineering research 
should be viewed as a form of insurance against climate change which would be negligent 
and unethical to spurn, even if it is only a stopgap measure that buys time for mitigation to 
succeed. 
 
Geoengineering may be a lesser evil than climate change but as Stephen Gardiner points out, 
it may nonetheless be so deeply harming that it should be treated as a ‘marring evil.’53 We 
may accept that supporters do not regard SRM as an alternative to emissions reductions while 
maintaining that it is ethically dubious to rely on hopeful claims of future success rather than 
effective mitigation strategies based upon energy conservation and renewable technologies. 
As Gardiner argues, to avoid being confronted with a choice of nightmares, the most rational 
approach should be the pursuit of a viable long-term solution.54 He argues that ‘there is 
something morally problematic about geoengineering proposals’ and that the burden of proof 
is therefore on those who support geoengineering.55 Gardiner cogently argues that pushing 
‘the most vulnerable to the point where they feel forced to accept pronounced subjugation to 
those who have made them desperate is a morally horrifying prospect which we have strong 
ethical reason to avoid.’56 
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53 Gardiner n 44. 
54 Gardiner, n 44 and S M Gardiner, ‘The Desperation Argument for Geoengineering’ (2013) Ps: Political 
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55 Gardiner, n 44 at 285. 
56 Gardiner (2013) n 54 28. 
A common objection to SRM is that it constitutes a moral hazard because it creates false 
hopes that science will produce a technological silver bullet that reduces incentives to cut 
emissions and benefits free riders who continue to use fossil fuels in the expectation that 
climate change is containable in a gamble with humanity’s future.57. For David Keith, a 
strong proponent of geoengineering:58 
 
The root problem is simple: Would mere knowledge of a geoengineering method that 
was demonstrably low in cost and risk weaken the political will to mitigate 
anthropogenic climate forcing? Knowledge of geoengineering has been characterized 
as an insurance strategy; in analogy with the moral hazard posed by collective 
insurance schemes, which encourage behaviour that is individually advantageous but 
not socially optimal, we may ascribe an analogous hazard to geoengineering if it 
encourages suboptimal investment in mitigation.59 
 
An example of moral hazard is Russia’s call for geoengineering to be included in the 2013 
IPCC report, perhaps in search of legitimacy for its desire to exploit oil and gas reserves in 
the Arctic and an attempt to divert attention away from its continuing heavy dependence on 
fossil fuels.60 
 
Jack Stilgoe acknowledges that despite uncertainties about its effectiveness and desirability, 
geoengineering has ‘acquired a deterministic frame, based on the assumption that it is 
“cheap” and “easy”’ and has thus become naturalised and ‘treated as a thing in the world to 
be understood rather than a highly controversial, highly speculative set of technological fix 
proposals.’61 Klein wonders whether the readiness of supporters of geoengineering to gloss 
over the risks and in some cases: 
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to ignore them entirely has something to do with who appears to be most vulnerable. 
After all, if … injecting sulfur into the stratosphere would cause widespread drought 
and famine in North America and Germany, as opposed to the Sahel and India, is it 
likely that this Plan B would be receiving such serious consideration?62 
 
Resorting to SRM may perpetuate and exacerbate historical injustices should the global North 
take ‘on the ultimate state of hubris to believe we can control Earth’ while telling those most 
at risk from climate change not be concerned by the developed world’s seemingly insatiable 
appetite for fossil fuels.63 
 
Technological fetishism is the belief that technology provides a solution to every problem 
and occurs when cognitive dissonance about threats such as climate change results in 
unjustifiable leaps of faith that unproven technologies will save humanity from itself. David 
Harvey argues that the ‘whole political-economic structure of power relations is suffused 
with a certain level of technological fetishism which can become self-sustaining.’64 In Greek 
mythology, Prometheus stole fire from the gods to elevate humanity to a divine level and was 
punished for his hubris. Clive Hamilton describes geoengineering as a dream that intuitively 
appeals to: 
 
a powerful strand of Western technological thinking and conservative politicking that 
sees no ethical or other obstacle to total domination of the planet. It is a Promethean 
urge named after the Greek titan who gave to humans the tools of technological 
mastery. Promethean plans have always met resistance from those who share a deep 
mistrust of human technological overreach, those who heed the warning that Nemesis 
waits in the shadows to punish Hubris.65 
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 Technological hubris is the belief that technological limitations, unforeseen side effects and 
unintended consequences can be solved by future innovations. It is often associated with 
climate sceptics who insist that renewable technologies are unreliable and more expensive 
than fossil fuels despite abundant evidence to the contrary.66 
 
Harvey notes that “Many technologies depend crucially upon hierarchically organized 
expertise and strong centralization of decision making, so that they are antagonistic to 
democratization as well as to individual autonomy. They depend fundamentally upon the 
cult of the expert. They foreclose on certain possibilities while they open up others.”67 Mike 
Hulme contends that debates about climate engineering are disproportionately influenced by 
a small geoclique of predominantly North American and British male scientists through 
landmark publications such as the 2009 Royal Society report.68 In his view, the geoclique 
aims to depoliticise climate engineering, making it imperative that its ‘can-do’ attitude should 
‘give way to the “should we” questions raised through ethical, moral and political 
reflection.’69 Technological hubris has induced humanity to transgress four planetary of nine 
planetary boundaries: climate change, loss of biosphere integrity, land-system change, and 
altered biogeochemical cycles (phosphorus and nitrogen).70 Foster observes that rather than 
‘addressing the real root of the crisis, the dominant response is to avoid all questions about 
the nature of our society, and to turn to technological fixes or market mechanisms of one sort 
or another.’71 
 
Since we know that renewable technologies can solve the problem if they are deployed early 
enough and on a sufficiently wide scale, we can agree with Sheila Jasanoff that wisdom and 
precaution should impel us towards technologies of humility that obviate the need for climate 
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engineering.72 Humility might prevent the illegitimate use of technologies for which consent 
has not been obtained from people whose rights may be severely affected if they are 
deployed. 
 
5. Climate Rights, Procedural Rights and the Governance of Geoengineering 
 
Deciding whether geoengineering should be encouraged or subject to a moratorium raises 
complex issues of governance and procedural justice. In light of unforeseen or unintended 
consequences that might affect everyone, failure to secure the widest possible level of 
consent would be unjust. Hulme argues that the ‘idea that global temperature is a suitable 
object of governance and one through which the well-being of humanity can be secured is a 
delusion’ because it assumes a non-existent global community with similar interests and 
values.73 The tension between technocratic evaluation and deliberative democracy is 
compounded by the difficulties in establishing fora in which informed individuals can 
participate on an equal basis and freely consent, including those whose participation has been 
limited such as women. As Cotton argues: 
 
The direct inclusion of individuals in the political and ethical discussion of 
technology implementation remains important because the implicit consent 
involved in technocratic decision-making or national and regional voting … is 
insufficient to legitimately expose individuals to additional or elevated risks, 
costs and other burdens that may result without informed consent. Inclusive 
participation is required so that consent can be obtained explicitly and 
transparently from those affected, improving the procedural fairness of all 
manner of decision-making processes and hence improving the democratic 
validity of a range of possible policy outcomes.74 
 
Steve Vanderheiden argues that the right to a stable climate is a basic human right: ‘The right 
to an adequate environment is intended to encompass a broad range of anthropocentric duties 
of environmental protection, and the right to climatic stability appears to be an obvious 
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corollary of such a right.’75 SRM threatens such a right unless it can be demonstrated beyond 
reasonable doubt that its advantages outweigh its risks. Principle 1 of the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment declares that 
human beings have ‘the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of 
life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and [… bear] 
a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future 
generations.’76 
 
The only instrument that unambiguously regulates intentional attempts to control the climate 
is the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (ENMOD).77 Article 1 prohibits the use of environmental 
modification techniques for military or other hostile purposes but ENMOD does not prohibit 
research. Article 3.1 states the Convention ‘shall not hinder the use of environmental 
modification techniques for peaceful purposes.’ 
 
Establishing a regime to regulate geoengineering will succeed only if its membership and 
decision-making processes are accepted as politically legitimate, and this in turn depends 
upon acceptable levels of transparency and ethical accountability.78 The importance of public 
participation in matters of environmental risk is recognised in international law and some 
writers argue that consent is amongst the most important ethical issues in climate 
engineering.79 It is widely accepted that states must incorporate procedural safeguards when 
making decisions that may cause environmental harms which undermine the enjoyment of 
human rights, including environmental impact assessments, securing the full and informed 
participation of those affected, and effective remedies for non-compliance. Gardiner contends 
that although geoengineering that has the consent of the most vulnerable is morally better 
than deployment without consultation, such consent is likely to be severely restricted and 
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given under duress: the consent of the desperate cannot justify geoengineering if it violated 
their rights or the rights of others, including the right ‘not to be subject to domination by 
another power.’ Obtaining assent in this manner would constitute an act of profound 
subjugation.80 
 
To exert control over the planetary system is to determine the basic life prospects of 
humans within that system, including the parameters against which they pursue their 
conceptions of the good, generate their ideals, and even conceive of their identities. In 
addition, it marks a further milestone in humanity’s evolving (most would say 
‘deteriorating’) relationship to nonhuman nature.81 
 
Syzerszinski et al. believe that SRM poses immense challenges to liberal democracies 
because ‘the unequal distribution of and uncertainties about SRM impacts will cause conflicts 
within existing institutions; that SRM will act at the planetary level and necessitate autocratic 
governance; that the motivations for SRM will always be plural and unstable; and that SRM 
will become conditioned by economic forces.’82 It will be difficult to construct processes to 
secure consent for climate engineering that do not replicate or deepen the democracy and 
legitimacy deficits that characterise so much decision making on climate and environmental 
issues, including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).83 
 
The 1998 Aarhus Convention was the first multilateral environmental agreement to outline 
the obligations of states towards their citizens. It encourages participatory decision making 
and promotes the rule of law by enabling citizens to enforce their rights. The Convention 
states that ‘every person has the right to live in an environment adequate to his or her health 
and well-being.’84 It contains provisions for notifying the public and facilitating effective 
participation in decisions affecting the environment, but does not stipulate who must be 
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consulted or the form that consultation should take. In addition, it does not require mandatory 
environmental impact assessments for every research project that carries an environmental 
risk and exempts research, development and testing ‘unless they would be likely to cause a 
significant adverse effect on environment or health’-a provision that appears to cover large-
scale geoengineering projects.85 
 
5.1 International Legal Principles 
 
Scott argues that the core principles of international environmental law applicable to 
geoengineering are prevention of harm; prevention of pollution; protection of vulnerable 
ecosystems and species; the precautionary principle; cooperation, information exchange, and 
environmental impact assessments; due regard for other states and users; state responsibility 
for environmental harm; and, possibly, sustainable development.86 
 
She concludes that the no-harm principle is an erga omnes norm that can be invoked by any 
state likely to be harmed by geoengineering-although it is unclear at what threshold the 
principle would become operational-and points out that the applicability of the principle may 
be tenuous because the aim of geoengineering is to mitigate the harms caused by 
anthropogenic global warming.87 Proving causation is likely to be difficult because claimant 
states will have to demonstrate that the harms caused result primarily geoengineering rather 
than the pre-existing impacts of climate change. 
 
In Scott’s view, ‘as a principle of customary international law, the precautionary approach 
requires the risk of serious harm to the environment and the degree of scientific uncertainty to 
be explicitly considered by decision makers charged with authorizing any geoengineering-
related activity.’88 The principle, which is designed to prevent adverse environmental 
impacts, appears in numerous multilateral environmental agreements as well as regional and 
domestic legislation. Principle 15 in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development states: ‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
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widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’89 This raises the 
question whether SRM, and SSI in particular, should be viewed as ecological threats or 
potentially cost-effective means of decreasing damage wrought by climate change. Differing 
interpretations of the principle mean that it’s efficacy as a norm of customary international 
law is contested. The principle was confirmed as customary international law by the 
International Court of Justice in the Pulp Mills decision, but its content of the principle is 
ambiguous and contested and the extent to which it is applicable to geoengineering is 
debatable.90 The strong version of the principle places the onus of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a technology is safe on the party wishing to utilise it and makes 
prohibition the default position when the science is uncertain and risks of environmental 
harms are strong. The weak version in Article 3(3) of the UNFCCC permits the degree of risk 
involved and the costs of making it safe to be taken into consideration, and permits 
deployment even though full scientific certainty cannot be established so long steps are taken 
to avoid serious irreversible damage. Bodle argues that its status in the UNFCCC is 
ambiguous at best.91 
 
The strong version prohibits SRM so long as risks of extensive and irreversible 
environmental harms exist, which will always be the case because these technologies cannot 
be tested on a wide scale without running such risks. In contrast, the weak version of the 
principle may allow SRM as a lesser evil than climate change despite lack of scientific 
certainty about its risks and the irreversible harms that may ensue. The strong version has 
been criticised as vague about its how it should be enforced;92 the weak version is less a 
guiding principle than a form of risk assessment. 
 
Farber argues that the precautionary principle is controversial because of the absence of 
consensus about its meaning and application. Some regard it as a basis for halting activities 
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when a certain level of risk becomes apparent, irrespective of cost, while for others it ‘merely 
creates a presumption against activities potentially harmful to the environment, placing 
the burden of proof on the advocates of those activities.’93 Neither formulation is precise and 
principle has been described as nothing more than advice to be careful. Farber discusses the 
argument that the principle should be developed on a case-by-case basis and efforts made to 
refine it in relation to situations in which there is uncertainty in addition to risk-such as a 
future climatic tipping point, where a failure to regulate may result in irreversible catastrophic 
harm.94 Climate engineering that altered the pattern of the South Asian monsoon would clearly 
satisfy these conditions unless those seeking to deploy a technique such as SRM were able to 
demonstrate its reversibility beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
Both weak and strong versions of the principle seem clearly applicable to geoengineering but 
proponents might argue that lack of full scientific certainty whether SSI will cause serious or 
irreversible damage should not be used as a reason for postponing its potential efficacy as a 
means of preventing further environmental degradation. As Bodansky observes, ‘in the case 
of geoengineering, failure to take action could also result in irreversible and catastrophic harm 
due to global warming, so it is unclear which way the principle cuts.’95 Ethics and politics 
arguably carry greater weight when the science is unclear and the law uncertain; the Royal 
Society report argued that ‘the acceptability of geoengineering will be determined as much by 
social, legal and political factors, as by scientific and technical factors.’96 
 
State practice makes it unclear whether precaution is more an attitude than an effective 
principle.97 The UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee considered the 
five Oxford Principles in its deliberations: geoengineering should be regulated as a public 
good;98 public participation in decision making; full disclosure of geoengineering research 
and open publication of results; and independent assessment of possible impacts; and 
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governance structures to be in place prior to deployment.99 It called for a set of principles to 
guide international regimes on geoengineering techniques and for ‘the groundwork for 
regulatory arrangements to begin.100 Stilgoe argues that collective experimentation is an 
appropriate mode of governance of geoengineering.101 It is impossible to prevent 
geoengineering research from taking place and unlikely that experimentation will escape 
surveillance. A comprehensive regulatory framework that promotes transparency and 
accountability would do much to secure consent and legitimacy but the diversity of 
geoengineering techniques militates against regulation and makes it difficult to justify a 
blanket prohibition on research.102 Such a framework might limit inadvertent transgressions, 
but intrinsic scientific uncertainties and the possibility that some technologies cannot be 
reversed makes it impossible for regulation to guarantee that human rights will not be 
violated. Relying on mitigation may be more difficult and less glamorous but much wiser 
than Plan B. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The failure of mitigation has encouraged advocates of geoengineering and those perhaps 
more concerned with patents and profits than ethics. Whether the Paris Agreement, whose 
enforcement mechanism appears to be naming and shaming, succeeds remains to be seen. 
Hulme describes climate change as a wicked problem that science cannot and should not try 
to fix.103 In his view, since science offers limited solutions the only way forward is to deal 
with the social, political, economic and ethical issues that have contributed to climate change. 
In Harvey’s words, it is ‘abundantly clear that there will be no major transformation in our 
relation to nature without changes in social relations, in mentalités, and in ways of 
sustaining material life, as well as in the hardware, software, and organizational forms of 
technologies.’104 We need to fix our attitudes rather than attempting to fix the planet. Shue 
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argues that delaying the transition to renewable technologies is unethical because it will 
subject our children and future generations to: 
 
risks of unknowable probability but of enormous possible magnitude, including radical 
change in the very conditions of life, human and non-human, on this planet. It is vital 
not to make the mistaken assumption that if the size of a risk is unknown, the risk must 
be small-as if it could be unknown only if it were too small to see… The imposition of 
such risks-of unknown (not necessarily small) probability and large magnitude-seems 
to me to be an inexcusable wrong.105 
 
Proponents of geoengineering have yet to provide a coherent response to Gardiner’s question: 
‘if the problem is social and political, why isn't the solution social and political as well?’106 
 
Klein accurately argues that geoengineering is ‘the ultimate expression of a desire to avoid 
doing the hard work of reducing emissions’107 and even a strong proponent like Keith accepts 
that it is ‘is a technical fix, kluge, or end-of-pipe solution. Rather than attacking the problems 
caused by fossil fuel combustion at their source, geoengineering aims to add new technology 
to counter their side effects.’108 In Hulme’s view, the dream of a global thermostat in the sky 
is undesirable, ungovernable and unattainable, and stratospheric aerosol injection ‘is the 
wrong sort of solution to the wrong sort of problem. Human-induced climate change is not 
the sort of problem that lends itself to technological end-of-pipe solutions.’109 
 
Anthropogenic climate change began with the extraction of coal through the use of 
technologies once regarded as benign ultimately had vast unforeseen, cataclysmic 
consequences. Currently, the mainstream view is that SRM technologies are too risky to 
deploy because they ‘carry risks that are poorly identified in their nature and unquantified.’ 
There is thus ‘significant potential for unanticipated, unmanageable, and regrettable 
consequences in multiple human dimensions from albedo modification at climate altering 
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scales, including political, social, legal, economic, and ethical dimensions.’110 We should 
heed the warning from the National Academy of Sciences that: 
 
The uncertainties in modelling of both climate change and the consequences of albedo 
modification make it impossible today to provide reliable, quantitative statements about 
relative risks, consequences, and benefits of albedo modification to the Earth system as 
a whole, let alone benefits and risks to specific regions of the planet.111 
 
The Royal Society report acknowledged that none of the methods it evaluated ‘offer an 
immediate solution to the problem of climate change and it is unclear which, if any, may ever 
pass tests required for potential deployment’-and little has changed since 2009.112 Renewable 
energy-technologies of humility-offers safe and cheap technologies that enable us to meet our 
ethical obligations, protect the human rights of current and future generations and resist the 
siren calls of those promoting unproven geoengineering methods, too often with profit in 
mind. The problem is less the absence of technological solutions than a suspension of 
morality and a failure of political will. The Paris Agreement contains lofty ambitions couched 
in vague terminology that do not bode well for the imperative to reduce GHG emissions; we 
may be running out of time, but mitigation is both prudent and ethically preferable at this 
juncture. As Caney argues, human rights are moral thresholds that should not be traded off 
against other putative advantages.113 They are not substitutable for other goods or values, and 
cannot easily be remedied when they are violated. Ethics requires preventing harm, prudence 
dictates precaution, and wisdom suggests that the safest technological solutions are best. 
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